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UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH 
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VOLUME 33 SUMMER 1972 NUMBER 4 
PENDENT JURISDICTION-THE PROBLEM OF 
"PENDENTING PARTIES" 
William H. Fortune* 
Federal courts have generally discouraged the joinder of a third party solely 
on the basis of a claim pendent to a federal cause of action. They have. however. 
been more liberal in allowing joinder in diversity cases. The author reviews the 
case law and argues that a more liberal attitude toward joinder should be adopted. 
except in diversity cases where. he believes. liberal joinder erodes the requirement 
of complete diversity. The Editors. 
"Pendent jurisdiction" is the generic and descriptive term used to ex-
plain a federal court's exercise of original jurisdiction over a claim 
which, standing alone, would not be within the jurisdiction of the court, 
but which is closely related to a substantial claim within the court's 
jurisdiction. Although pendent jurisdiction has received much scholarly 
attention,1 the scholars have been remiss in failing to note the inconsist-
ent and illogical results in cases in which the exercise of pendent jurisdic-
tion would bring into the case a new party; a party against whom or by 
whom no claim is asserted which has an independent jurisdictional base. 
This occurs in all diversity cases in which application of pendent juris-
diction is sought and occurs in federal question cases if the federal claim 
is asserted only against one defendant and a related state claim is as-
serted against a co-defendant. The courts have, illogically it is felt, 
generally approved "pendenting parties" in diversity cases, but have 
* A.B. 1961, University of Kentucky; J.D. 1964, University of Kentucky College of Law; 
Assistant Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law. 
I. Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute. 36 u. CHI. L. REV. 268, 
281-86 (1969); Shakman, The New Pendent Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 20 STAN. L. REV. 
262 (1968) [hereinafter cited as ShakmanJ; Note, UMW v. Gibbs and Pendent Jurisdiction, 81 
HARV. L. REV. 657 (1968); Note, The Evolution and Scope of the Doctrine of Pendent Jurisdiction 
in the Federal Courts, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 1018 (1962). The American Law Institute proposes to 
codify the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN 
STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS, § 1313(a)(c) (1969 ed.); but does not purport to deal directly with 
the problems raised herein. 
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disapproved the joining of new parties in federal question cases. Oppo-
site results should be reached, as this article will show. 
The judicial development of pendent jurisdiction clearly establishes 
that the concept is one of subject matter jurisdiction and that the fact 
that the pendent claim is asserted against a new party is irrelevant. A 
court which decides to exercise pendent jurisdiction must have deter-
mmined that: 1) the claim of the plaintiff standing by itself is not within 
the subject matter jurisdiction of the court; 2) the claim was presented 
by the plaintiff with a substantial and closely related claim which was 
within the court's jurisdiction; and 3) the claim which gave the court 
jurisdiction either remained a part of the litigation until the end or was 
not dismissed until a point in the proceedings at which, in the interest 
of total judicial economy, fairness to the litigants, and the striking of 
the proper balance in the federal-state relations, the court was war-
ranted in retaining jurisdiction over the related claim and resolving it 
on the merits. A federal court's power to resolve matters which by 
themselves are beyond the court's jurisdiction is a logical extension of 
Chief Justice Marshall's indisputable axiom that a federal court in de-
ciding a claim of federal origin must be able to resolve matters of state 
law where necessary to resolution of the federal claim.2 In Siler v. 
Louisville & Nashville R.R.3 this axiom was extended to justify the 
resolution of a state claim which made the resolution of a federal claim 
based on the Constitution unnecessary, and in Hurn v. Oursler to justify 
the resolution of a state claim after dismissal of a federal claim on the 
merits. 
2. Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 820-24 (1824). This axiom was 
postulated to support Marshall's reasoned argument that the statute authorizing the Bank of the 
United States to sue in the federal courts was constitutional. 
3. 213 U.S. 175 (1909). 
4. 289 U.S. 238 (1933). In Hum the Court held, that where the federal claim (copyright 
infringement) and the state claim (unfair competition) were merely separate grounds for the same 
cause of action. the federal court could entertain the state claim after dismissal of the federal claim. 
Hum was based on two cases: Moore v. New York Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593 (1926), in which 
the presence of a substantial federal claim was held to give a district court jurisdiction of a non-
federal counterclaim which, jurisdictional questions aside, would have been compulsory as it arose 
out of the same transaction as the original claim; and Siler v. Louisville and Nashville R.R. Siler 
can be explained as a case in which the result was dictated by the Court's traditional policy of 
avoiding constitutional questions whenever possible and Moore as an application of the compulsory 
counterclaim rule [it is clear, however, that the reasoning of Moore is specious-if a court lacks 
jurisdiction over a counterclaim it cannot be compulsory; see Shakman, supra note I, at 272-77]. 
Thus Hum, where neither avoidance of a constitutional question nor application of a unitary 
procedural rule was involved, established a new and broader principle for the exercise of jurisdic-
tion over state claims, the principle that, in the interest of judicial economy a federal court is 
warranted in deciding a state claim which is an alternate ~heory of relief to the federal claim which 
establishes the basis for jurisdiction. 
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In United Mine Workers v. Gibbs5 the Court attempted to clear 
up the confusion created by the imprecise terminology of Hurn6 and 
postulated the rule for the initial exercise of jurisdiction over the "pen-
dent" claim as follows: 
The federal claim must have substance sufficient to confer subject matter 
jurisdiction on the court. . . . The state and federal claims must derive from a 
common nucleus of operative fact. But if considered without regard to their 
federal or state character a plaintiff's claims are such that he would ordinarily 
be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding, then, assuming substantial-
ity of the federal issues, there is power in federal courts to hear the whole.7 
In Gibbs, as in Hurn, the federal claim was dismissed after a trial on 
the merits. It required little extra expenditure of judicial energy at that 
point to resolve the state claim, as the evidence which had already been 
produced was determinative of the issues raised by the state claim. 
Furthermore it would have been patently unfair to the parties not to 
settle the matter. The plaintiff would have been given false hope of 
recovering on the merits and possibly induced into a lengthy trial in state 
court which ultimately would be resolved against him. The defendant 
might have been forced to defend a costly and senseless suit on issues 
which had been resolved once in his favor. Present also in Gibbs was a 
concern of federalism8 that made the exercise of pendent jurisdiction 
over the state claim particularly appropriate. The state claim (conspir-
acy and interference with contract) was answered by a federal defense 
(pre-emption of the state tort law by the federal Taft-Hartley Act) which 
raised an important question of the limit of permissible state regulation 
in the labor field, a question of national importance which had to be 
decided as a matter of federal law. The district court, by deciding the 
state claim on the theory of pendent jurisdiction made it possible for the 
Supreme Court to rule on this matter at an early date. If the district 
court had dismissed the state claim the matter would have come before 
the Court much later, on appeal or certiorari from the highest state 
5. 383 u.s. 715 (1966). 
6. Confusion arose over the proper construction of "cause of action." Courts furthermore 
tended to intrepret the test more narrowly than the Court had intended. 383 U.S. 722-25. See 
generally, Note, The Evolution and Scope of the Doctrine of Pendent Jurisdiction in the Federal 
Courts, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 1018, 1026-30 (1962); Note, UMW v. Gibbs and Pendent Jurisdiction, 
81 HARV. L. REV. 657 (1968); The Supreme Court 1965 Term, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91,220 (1966); 
Note, 44 TEX. L. REV. 1631 (1966). 
7. 383 U.S. at 725. 
8. It is felt that the proper functioning of the federal system existing in the United States 
requires that a cause of action based on a federal statute or the Constitution be freely triable in a 
federal court. 
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court, and only then if the case were prosecuted by one side or the other 
through the state court system to the Supreme Court. Gibbs, in short, 
was a case that clearly should have been resolved completely if the 
power to do so were present. 
The Court foresaw, however, that district courts would be faced 
with cases in which the need to retain jurisdiction over the state claim 
was not as clear. This would occur if the federal claim was dismissed at 
a stage of the proceedings when further evidence would be required to 
dispose of the state claim, or where there was no particular federal 
concern which made the state claim appropriate for resolution by a 
federal court. Thus the Court in Gibbs set out guidelines to make it clear 
that the exercise of pendent jurisdiction was discretionary; that a district 
court was warranted in refusing to apply the doctrine if it became con-
vinced at any time that the state issues predominated; and that if the 
federal claim was dismissed the district court could, within its discre-
tion, dismiss or retain the state claim depending on the extent of dupli-
cation which would occur in the state court if the pendent claim were 
dismissed.9 Within the general guidelines of judicial economy and fair-
ness to litigants a factor such as the running of the statutes oflimitations 
could obviously be considered. And, from the facts of Gibbs, the pres-
ence of a federal issue in the state claim would warrant the retention of 
that claim even if there would be no great duplication of judicial energy 
or unfairness to litigants if the parties were forced to litigate the state 
claim in state court. 
In both Hum and Gibbs the federal and state claims were asserted 
against the same defendant. Most lower courts have, in federal question 
cases, read this as an inherent limitation on the doctrine of pendent 
jurisdiction and have refused to apply the principle in cases where a 
federal claim is asserted against one defendant and a closely related 
state claim against a co-defendant.1O At the same time, however, the 
lower courts have, with some hesitation, gradually extended pendent 
jurisdiction to diversity cases where one of the claims is for less than 
the requisite jurisdictional amount, $10,000, if the claims arise out of the 
9. [d. at 726-27. 
10. The following is a list of cases in which the court has denied the existence of the power 
to join the related claim against a co-defendant: Moor v. Madigan, 458 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1972); 
Wojtas v. Village of Niles, 334 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 964 (I 965}; Benbow 
v. Wolf, 217 F.2d 203 (9th Cir. 1954); Wasserman v. Perugini, 173 F.2d 305 (2d Cir. 1949); New 
Orleans Public Belt R.R. v. Wallace, 173 F.2d 145 (5th Cir. 1949); Pearce v. Pennsylvania R.R., 
162 F.2d 524 (3d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 765 (I947); Jennings v. Davis, 339 F. Supp. 
919 (W.D. Mo. 1972); Barrows v. Faulkner, 327 F. Supp. 1190 (N.D. Okla. 1971). 
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